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CRAWFORD AND BEYOND: REVISITED IN
DIALOGUE
INTRODUCTION
(“It’s déjà vu all over again”* with Davis twists)
Robert M. Pitler**
This symposium issue of the Journal of Law and Policy is devoted
to articles addressing the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
limitations on the admissibility of hearsay evidence. These articles
derive in large part from papers presented and commentary given by
their authors at a September 29, 2006 Brooklyn Law School
conference, “Crawford and Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue.”1 As the
program began, there was an air of déjà vu because, only a year and a
half earlier, many of those present had attended “Crawford and
Beyond: Exploring the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past.”2
The 2005 conference focused on the landmark decision in
Crawford v. Washington,3 which dramatically changed the Court’s

*

YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: I DIDN’T REALLY SAY EVERYTHING I SAID 30
(Workman Publishing 1998).
**
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges
the invaluable assistance of Charles Krause, research assistant David Stromes, and the
Brooklyn Law School research and reference librarians, Rosemary Campagna, Jean
Davis, Linda Holmes, Harold O’Grady, Jim Murphy and Vicki Szymczak.
1
The hypotheticals considered throughout the all-day conference can be found at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/crawford/hypotheticals.
2
Articles and essays from the 2005 symposium were published in 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 1–427 (2005).
3
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and its application to
hearsay statements sought to be introduced against a criminal
defendant. The change in approach was brought about by the
abandonment of the Ohio v. Roberts indicia of reliability framework
previously used to determine confrontation/hearsay issues.4 Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the seven-justice Crawford majority found the
Roberts reliability standard wanting because its “subjective” and
“unpredictable” nature led to a “proven capacity” and “unpardonable
vice” of lower courts admitting the very kinds of uncross-examined
hearsay that the Confrontation Clause was designed to exclude.5
According to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause requires crossexamination of a hearsay declarant, not a judicial inquiry into the
reliability of a hearsay statement.6
Crawford replaced the Roberts approach with a history-based
categorical exclusion of out-of-court “testimonial” hearsay statements
made by “witnesses,” i.e. declarants, who do not testify at trial,
unless the prosecution demonstrates that that witness is presently
unavailable to testify and that the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.7
The 2006 “Crawford and Beyond” conference, of course, again
spotlighted Crawford principles—this time Davis v. Washington
provided increased wattage.8 Justice Scalia, again writing for the
Court, sought to refine one subcategory of testimonial
statements⎯those obtained by police interrogation⎯and addressed
other confrontation/hearsay issues as well. This introductory essay
seeks to present an integrated version of Crawford-Davis confrontation

4

448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (indicia of reliability is present if a statement is within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception or the statement bears particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness).
5
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–65 (mentioning grand jury testimony,
accomplice and conspirator plea colloquies, affidavits, and custodial confessions of
accomplices).
6
Id. at 61.
7
541 U.S. at 53–54.
8
126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
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principles with specific references to the articles presented in this
Symposium.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND HISTORY
The Sixth Amendment provides that: “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”9 Guided by an 1828 dictionary, the
Crawford majority concluded that witnesses against an accused are
those who bear testimony, and testimony, in turn, typically means “[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact.”10 Consequently, only the declarant of a
“testimonial” hearsay statement is a witness within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause. To the majority, this definition reflected the
main historical concern of the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Scalia emphasized that it was English history and the
common law that guided the Framers of the Confrontation Clause.11
According to Crawford, the principal evil sought to be addressed by
that Clause was the prosecution’s introduction at trial of hearsay
statements of non-testifying declarants, obtained through private ex
parte examinations by judicial and executive officers of the crown.
These examinations were conducted under the “civil-law mode of
criminal procedure,”12 the hallmark of the continental inquisitorial
system.13 In contrast, the English common law tradition focused on
live, in-court testimony, with the opportunity for adversarial testing.14
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia noted that, at times, elements of the
civil mode of criminal procedure found their way into English practice,

9

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 51.
11
Id. at 43. The political, religious, social, cultural and legal cultural history of
confrontation in England is an exceedingly rich and complex one, with a cast of
colorful characters, memorable events and institutions thoroughly explored in
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 6341–43 at 183–346 (West Publishing Co. 1997) [hereinafter WRIGHT
& GRAHAM].
12
541 U.S. at 50.
13
Id. at 43.
14
Id.
10
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pointing to two particular settings.15
In the notorious political treason trials of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, judicial and executive officers of the Crown
conducted secret private ex parte examinations of suspects, coconspirators, accomplices, and other witnesses.16
In particular,
throughout the Crawford opinion, reference is made to the 1603
treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh17 at which an otherwise available
co-conspirator, Lord Cobham, had “testified” through the introduction
of his ex parte examination and two letters he sent to the judges
presiding at the trial; Raleigh’s demands for Cobham to make his
accusation in person proved futile.18
15

Id.
See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 1 A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF
ENGLAND, 325 (London, McMillan & Co. 1883).
17
See 541 U.S. at 44, 50, 52, 62.
18
The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM
THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783 1, 15–16, 23 (T.B. Howell ed., T.C.
Hansard 1816) [hereinafter: HOW. ST. TR.]. It appears that torture or threats of it was
used against other witnesses to secure oral or written statements against Raleigh. Id.
at 19, 22. Unmentioned by Justice Scalia is a witness at the Raleigh trial, an ocean
pilot named Dyer, who testified to a conversation he had in Lisbon with a Portuguese
gentleman, who said that Raleigh and Cobham would cut the King’s throat before he
could take the throne. 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 25. The confrontation and hearsay
implications of this statements is explored later in this Symposium. See Robert P.
Mosteller, Confrontation as Criminal Procedure: Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require
that Roberts had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 712–16 (2007); see also Introduction,
Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of
Its Past, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 8 n.28 (2005) [hereinafter Introduction].
Though not a lawyer, Raleigh had read the law while a prisoner in the tower
awaiting trial. 2 How. St. Tr., supra note 18, at 16; The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh,
in 1 DAVID JARDINE, HISTORICAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 418 (1832) [hereinafter JARDINE].
At the trial, he acquitted himself (the judges did not) quite admirably and eloquently,
including his constant verbal jousting with Attorney General Coke, and in particular,
his demand for Cobham’s presence and accusation to his face. See 2 How. St. Tr.,
supra note 18 at 16, 19, 22; JARDINE, supra note 18, at 420. Raleigh concluded that
Cobham’s presence would not be required if “my accuser were dead or abroad; but he
liveth and is in this very house.” JARDINE, supra note 18, at 448–49. Moreover,
many of Raleigh’s objections to hearsay and multiple hearsay were well-framed and
on the mark, including that all the hearsay rested on Cobham’s accusation. See 2
How. St. Tr., supra note 18, at 20; JARDINE, supra note 18, at 429, 430, 436.
Raleigh’s post-conviction activities tell a fascinating fourteen-year story which is
briefly recounted. Introduction, supra note 18, at 8 n.9; see also 2 How. St. Tr.,
supra note 18, at 31–33, 55–59; JARDINE, supra note 18, at 476–79.
16
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The civil law mode of criminal procedure was also present in the
more ordinary, everyday criminal case, in which justices of the peace,
under the authority of the sixteenth century Marian statutes, conducted
pretrial release, bail and committal hearings, examining witnesses,
accomplices and suspects.19 The examinations were reduced to
writing and subsequently read as evidence at trial.20
According to Justice Scalia, by 1791, when the Sixth Amendment
was ratified, if not long before, a series of English statutory reforms
and judicial decisions had developed a limited common law
confrontation right.21 That right encompassed the kinds of testimonial
hearsay statements produced by the treason prosecutions and the
Marian preliminary examination, but no other nontestimonial hearsay
statements.22
The Crawford majority also briefly touched upon the use of
controversial examination practices in the colonies and the reactions to
them.23 Despite these American references, Justice Scalia had no
19
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. Over time, the Marian examinations became ever
more inquisitorial, sometimes even involving the use of torture, leading to a
“dictatorship of the JPs.” See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 6342 at 229–
313.
20
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (citing 2 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
284 (1736)).
21
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45–46.
22
See id. at 44–47. But see Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know
and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71
BROOK L. REV. 105, 189–215, 120–188 (2005) (there is no historical basis for the
testimonial/non-testimonial distinction and there was no rigid, common law crossexamination requirement regarding Marian examinations). Subsequently, Professor
Davies and Robert Kry, who served as Justice Scalia’s law clerk for the October 2003
term of the Court (during which Crawford was decided), engaged in a spirited,
illuminating and engrossing debate over the existence of a common law right of
confrontation with respect to Marian examinations offered at trial. Compare Robert
Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A Reply to Professor Davies, 72
BROOK L. REV. 493 (2006), with Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional
Originalism in Crawford’s Cross-examination Rule: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK.
L. REV. 557 (2007).
23
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–49 (describing the Virginia Governor’s private
issuance of commissions to conduct ex parte examinations of witnesses against
particular individuals, John Adams’s condemnation of ex parte examinations during
the Admiralty Court smuggling trial of John Hancock, and many of the revolutionary
American declarations of rights that included confrontation provisions. For a
comprehensive study of confrontation in America from the colonial experience to the
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doubt that it was the English common law right of confrontation to
which the Sixth Amendment referred.24
The historical record supported a second proposition, stated Justice
Scalia: “. . . the Framers would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless
he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”25
Concurring in Crawford, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justice O’Connor, remained unconvinced that the Confrontation
Clause mandated the categorical exclusion of all solicited testimonial
statements.26 Given that the law during the time of the Framers was
not fully settled, the Chief Justice thought it “odd” to conclude that
the Framers “created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the
admissibility of testimonial statements . . . .”27 The Chief Justice also
emphasized that the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements was no more based in history than the Ohio v. Roberts
reliability framework.28
*

*

*

In his article, University of Tennessee Professor Thomas Y.
adoption of the Sixth Amendment, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11 § 6344 at
348 (“. . . the history of confrontation in America was not a reflection of its history
in England but a refraction of that history . . . . the light of English development of
confrontation was bent as it passed through the prism of colonial experience.”).
24
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing early American decisions reflecting the
English confrontation right with respect to depositions); see also Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (“We are bound to interpret the [Confrontation Clause] in
light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new
guarantees of the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual such as he
already possessed as a British subject,—such as his ancestors had inherited and
defended since the days of Magna Charta.”). But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
11, § 6348 at 784 (“It is misleading if not mistaken to say that the Sixth Amendment
was intended to adopt the common law.”).
25
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54.
26
Id. at 72.
27
Id. at 73.
28
Id. at 69–76. Perhaps most important to Chief Justice Rehnquist was the long
term uncertainty that would surely be created by this new testimonial/nontestimonial
formula, id., and his belief that the Roberts framework was more than adequate to
address the confrontation issues prescribed in Crawford. Id. at 75–76.
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Davies concludes that Framing-Era authorities indicate that the
introduction of unsworn hearsay statements violated basic principles of
common-law criminal evidence, based in turn on the confrontation
right.29
Accordingly,
Crawford’s
testimonial/nontestimonial
formulation “does not reflect the Framers’ design,”30 and permitting
the introduction of “nontestimonial” hearsay is “inconsistent with the
basic premises that shaped the Framer’s understanding of the right.”31
According to Professor Davies, only two kinds of out-of-court
statements were admissible: a sworn statement of an unavailable
witness32 and a dying declaration—the functional equivalent of a sworn
statement.33 After analyzing the historical cases discussed in Davis
and Crawford, Professor Davies concludes that neither decision
identified a single example of a Framing-Era case that admitted
unsworn hearsay against a criminal defendant.34
In his article, New York Law School Professor Randolph N.
Jonakait observes that if Framing-Era views (including those shortly
after the Framing) are to control the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause, it is “American views from that era that are most important,
and the best sources of American viewpoints and ideas are American
cases, not English cases.”35 Professor Jonakait proceeds to examine
extensively two early American cases,36 concluding that the American
courts of the Framing Era enforced a general ban on hearsay as being
“no testimony”37 and recognized very few hearsay exceptions.38
Moreover, Professor Jonakait points out that nothing in the
29

Thomas Y. Davies, Not the Framer’s Design: How the Framing-Era Ban
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of
the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352 (2007).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 354.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 448.
35
Randolph N. Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of
Confrontation: Beyond Brasier’s Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases,
15 J.L. & POL’Y 471, 473 (2007).
36
Id. at 478–83, 484–93.
37
Id. at 491.
38
Id. at 493.
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Framing-Era cases reflects Crawford’s testimonial/nontestimonial
distinction.39 Professor Jonakait acknowledges that the early American
cases do not speak directly to the right of confrontation,40 but the
cases he cites directly show the Framing Era’s judicial concern about
the use of out-of-court statements in a criminal case and the general
bar to their admissibility.41
TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS
Crawford did not articulate an overarching definition of
“testimonial,” leaving that “for another day.”42 The majority simply
noted that, at a minimum, the category included testimony before the
grand jury, or prior trial or preliminary hearing testimony, and
statements produced by police interrogations—the “modern practices
with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed.”43 Davis, like Crawford, did not provide a
comprehensive definition of “testimonial.”
The category of testimonial statements is not limited to those
mentioned in Crawford.44 Indeed, looking to an old, non-modern
practice, Davis added to the testimonial list volunteered accusatory
statements to the government.45 Significantly, testimonial statements of
39

Id. at 491 (noting a trial court’s statement that if a private journal of a
defendant were produced, it would be admissible against its author but not against any
other defendant).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75.
43
Id. at 68.
44
See id; Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006). Curiously, the
Crawford opinion omitted affidavits and plea allocutions from the testimonial
category, even though they were mentioned earlier in the opinion as being testimonial.
541 U.S. at 68. Subsequently in Davis, the Court recognized the testimonial nature of
an affidavit, 126 S.Ct. at 2280, and other courts have had no difficulty holding plea
colloquies testimonial. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d
Cir. 2004).
45
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274, n.1 (“The Framers were no more willing to exempt
from cross-examination volunteered testimony . . . than they were to exempt answers
to detailed interrogation.” Also noting that Lord Cobham’s letter to the commission at
Raleigh’s trial was plainly not the product of sustained questioning). Still, Cobham
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this kind are certainly not produced by the kind of ex parte
examination or abuse at which the Confrontation Clause is primarily,
but, as the Court made clear, not exclusively, directed.46
A. Statements Elicited By Police Interrogation
To the Crawford and Davies majority, “[p]olice interrogations
bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in
England.”47 Despite the resemblance language, Davis makes clear
that “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms
against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its
extinction.”48
The Crawford majority observed that, like the
testimonial category of statements, the subcategory of police
interrogation-produced statements has many possible definitions. Still,
no further definition was required because Sylvia Crawford’s
recorded (Miranda-warned) statement, knowingly given in response to
was a prisoner when he wrote the letter, and the details of how it came to be written
are nowhere set forth except that at trial, one commissioner stated the letter was
voluntary “and not extracted from the Lord Cobham upon any hopes of promise or
pardon.” 2 HOW. ST. TR., supra note 18, at 29. In addition to a letter, a volunteered
statement could take the form of an affidavit, an in-person oral statement, an audio or
video recording. See Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05-5705, Oral Argument, Mar. 20,
2006, 32–37 (comments and questions of Justices Scalia, Souter and Chief Justice
Roberts); see also State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 527–28, 528–29 (Wis. 2007)
(holding testimonial both voice-mail messages to police by victim that defendant was
trying to kill her, and statements in the victim’s letter given to a neighbor with
instructions to turn it over to the police if anything happened to her).
46
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2279 n.6 (“Police investigations themselves are, of
course, in no way impugned by our characterization of their fruits as testimonial.
Investigations of past crimes prevent future harms and lead to necessary arrests.” Cf.
Oral Argument in Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05-5705 at 32 (corruption of a statement
by interrogation or other abuse was not the only concern of the Founders who “I think
believed in a judicial system, at least in criminal cases, where the person has the right
to cross-examine his accuser.” (Remarks of Scalia, J.). Id. at 33 (One of the
concerns of the Confrontation Clause is witnesses who have a motive to frame the
defendant and do so even though there is no police abuse in securing the statement)
(Remarks of Kennedy, J.). Still Davis, leaves that the Confrontation Clause is only
offended by “the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial
statements.” 126 S.Ct. at 2279 n.6.
47
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; see also Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2278.
48
126 S.Ct. at 2278 n.5.

PITLER INTRO.DOC

337a

9/13/2007 10:40 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

structured police questioning, would have qualified under any
conceivable definition.49
Subsequently, in Davis, Justice Scalia shifted focus from “police
interrogations” to interrogations by “law enforcement officers,”50
observing that the Crawford Court “. . . had immediately in mind . . .
interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime,
in order to identify . . . the perpetrator.” Justice Scalia continued,
“[t]he product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing
signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory . . . of the
interrogating officer, is testimonial.”51
As noted, Davis, like Crawford, did not provide a comprehensive
definition of testimonial, but it did further refine the meaning of police
interrogation in two distinct settings, cautioning that its holding was
limited to deciding Hammon and Davis.52
i) Statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively
indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,
and the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ongoing
emergency to justify the interrogation.53
Responding to a domestic disturbance, the police went to the
private home of Amy and Herschel Hammon where they encountered
49

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. The use of “knowingly” implies that the
declarant must know that he or she is speaking to law enforcement. See also Davis,
126 S.Ct. at 2275 (indicating the nontestimonial nature of statements made unwittingly
to a government informant) (citing Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181–84
[1987]); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (same). The Court, however, has never
expressly held that there is such a requirement, and the issue remains open.
50
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274.
51
Id. at 2276 (“. . . we do not think it conceivable that the protections of the
Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite
the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a
deposition.”) (emphasis in original).
52
Id. at 2273 (“[We are not] attempting to produce an exhaustive classification
of all conceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police
interrogations—as either testimonial or nontestimonial . . . .”); see also id. at 2278
n.5 (repeating a similar caution limiting the holdings to a resolution of the “cases
before us and those like them.”).
53
Id. at 2273–74.
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a calm domestic setting with no apparent emergency. After an initial
police inquiry, speaking with the husband and then separating him
from his wife, and following some prompting and prodding, Amy
Hammon described her husband’s assault which had apparently
provoked the domestic disturbance call. Justice Scalia, for the
majority, noted that during this questioning, the officer was no longer
seeking to determine “what is happening” but rather, “what
happened.”54 This questioning was testimonial in nature because
“[o]bjectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of
the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime . . . .”55
Like the custodial questions and answers in Crawford, Ms.
Hammon’s statements deliberately recounted, in response to police
questioning, how past, potentially criminal, events began and
progressed, and the questioning took place soon after the described
events transpired. To the Court, “[s]uch statements under official
interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they
do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are
inherently testimonial.”56 Put another way, “the evidentiary products
of the ex parte communications [of Amy Hammon and Sylvia
Crawford] aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues.”57
Notably, the Davis majority rejected a more flexible approach to the
introduction of interrogation-produced statements in a domestic
violence setting,58 reflecting its general view that “[t]he text of the
Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from

54

Id. at 2278.
Id. Justice Thomas dissented in Hammon and summed up his numerous
concerns by observing that the unpredictable primary purpose standard adopted by
the Court was neither “workable, nor a targeted attempt to reach the abuses forbidden
by the [Confrontation] Clause.” See 126 S.Ct. at 2281–85. Justice Scalia responded
that the Court’s approach was still a work in progress and, for the cases decided, the
test is objective and quite workable. Id. at 2285. Moreover, observed Justice Scalia,
the dissent had proposed nothing remotely workable other than a vague distinction
between “formal” and “informal” statements which was but a mere form of words.
Id.
56
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2278 (emphasis in original).
57
Id. at 2277.
58
Id. at 2279–80.
55
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the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts.”59
*

*

*

In her article, University of Maine Professor Deborah
Tuerkheimer views the Davis Court’s focus on description of past
events as inappropriate in domestic violence settings because the
nature of domestic violence is not episodic.60 Put simply, the
“continuing” nature of domestic violence does not lend itself to the
Court’s “binary” framework in which declarants either “cry for help”
or “provide information.”61 Professor Tuerkheimer argues that in
domestic violence cases, a battered woman must often provide
information regarding “past events” and past violence in order to
prevent imminent violence.62 Whether an emergency exists, in such
cases, cannot be determined without an understanding of the context of
domestic violence cases; therefore, emergency and past abuse are
inextricably intertwined such that domestic violence victims cannot
seek help without describing the past events.63
In Professor
Tuerkheimer’s judgment, the Court’s testimonial characterization of
statements describing past events, will, in the domestic violence
context, result in exclusion of statements that are, in fact, cries for
help.64
ii) “Statements are nontestimonial [for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause] when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.”65
Davis involved a 911 call and plea for help while the caller
59

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation
and its Loss, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 725, 737 (2007).
61
Id. at 733 n.21.
62
Id. at 732.
63
Id. at 732–33.
64
Id. at 728, 735–36.
65
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2268–69.
60
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(Michelle McCottry) was being assaulted by her former boyfriend,
Adrian Davis. Once she began talking to the 911 operator, Davis fled
and, as he was fleeing, Ms. McCottry identified Davis by name in
response to the operator’s inquiry.
Characterizing the 911 call as a cry for help and viewing the
circumstances objectively, the Court recognized that Ms. McCottry
“simply was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying.”66 What
she said was not a “weaker substitute for live testimony” at trial;67
rather, this was an emergency call for police assistance against a bona
fide physical threat68 that, in relevant part, described the offense as it
was occurring. Objectively viewed, the primary purpose of the 911
operator’s questions and the information provided by the caller was to
secure police assistance to an ongoing emergency, not to prove or
establish past events.69
The opinion seemingly recognized that the statements Ms.
McCottry made after the emergency had subsided—when Davis had
fled—were testimonial and should be redacted.70 Still, as Ms.
McCottry reported Davis’ flight, the operator asked a nontestimonial
question to secure the identity of the assailant so that the dispatched
officers would know whether they may encounter a violent individual,
and Ms. McCottry gave a nontestimonial response in naming Davis.71
For the purposes of the Davis opinion, the Court assumed in a
footnote (but did not decide) that questioning by 911 operators were
acts of the police.72 That same footnote goes on to state that, like
Crawford, the holding in Davis makes it “unnecessary to consider
whether and when statements made to someone other than law
enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’”73
*
66

*

*

Id. at 2277 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Id.
68
Id. at 2276. The emphasis on the statement as describing ongoing events is
not captured by the Court’s holding. See 126 S.Ct. at 2288, set forth at note 53,
supra.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 2277.
71
Id. at 2276.
72
Id. at 2274 n.2.
73
Id.
67
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In “Crawford, Davis and Way Beyond,” University of Michigan
Law School Professor, Richard Friedman, a leading confrontation
scholar who represented Hammon before the Supreme Court, finds the
primary purpose of both the interrogator and the witness to whom
he/she is speaking ill-suited to define a testimonial police
interrogation.74 He so concludes because determining primary purpose
is quite difficult since the interrogator often has more than one
purpose, and the multiple purposes may be inextricably intertwined.75
Thus, after-the-fact labeling of one purpose as primary is an arbitrary
exercise which invites judicial manipulation to ensure that the
statement will be held admissible.76
Professor Friedman rhetorically inquires why the existence of
police interrogation should turn on the purpose of the interrogator
when, as he has argued at length, it is the witness’s perspective that
should be controlling.77 Moreover, he points out that the Davis Court
recognized as much when it observed: “And of course, even when
interrogation exists . . . it is in the final analysis the declarant’s
statements not the interrogator’s questions that the Confrontation
Clause requires us to evaluate.”78
Thus, concludes Professor
Friedman, Davis is perfectly compatible with his approach, which
focuses on anticipation of the statement’s prosecutorial use from the
perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person possessing all of and
only the information known to the declarant at the time of
questioning.79 He concludes that his approach would be less prone to
manipulation by the prosecution-favoring lower courts80 and that
nothing in the hypothetical reasonable person approach is in any way
inconsistent with Davis.81

74

Richard Friedman, Crawford, Davis and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553,
559 (2007).
75
Id. at 559–60.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 560. See Richard Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of
“Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 255-59 (2005).
78
Friedman, supra note 74 at 560–61 (citing Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n.1).
79
Id. at 561–63.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 572.
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Professor Friedman is also concerned that the ambiguity in the
terms “primary purpose” and “ongoing emergency,” along with the
manner in which the Court applied them in Hammon and Davis, will
encourage judges to manipulate the Crawford-Davis framework to
admit accusatory statements in much the same fashion as did the
discarded Roberts standard.82 Nevertheless, he expresses the hope that
manipulation will be limited by the Davis requirement that the witness
must be describing events as they are actually happening.83
In her article, Southwestern Law School Professor Myrna Raeder
finds that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” approach is
almost as arbitrary as the discarded Roberts reliability framework. 84
Professor Raeder is also concerned that the Court’s objective standard
could be manipulated to mask improper motives by of law
enforcement officials.85
In his article, Stanford University Law School Professor Jeffrey
Fisher, who represented Crawford and Davis before coming to
academia, views “the emergency/non-emergency dichotomy [as] the
wrong touchtone to resolve disputes about statements describing fresh
criminal activity.”86 Additionally, Professor Fisher thinks that there is
very little, if any, relevance in resolving the testimonial issue by
focusing on the primary purpose of the interrogation.87 At least in
scenarios not dealing with police interrogation, he is doubtful about
the soundness of the reasonable person test because it could easily lead
to inconsistent results and is too easily judicially manipulable.88
Turning to other features of Davis, Professor Fisher proposes a
two-prong framework for assessing the testimonial nature of
statements to police officers describing recent criminal events. First,
he looks to the common law evidentiary res gestae doctrine that

82

Id. at 563.
Id. at 563–64.
84
Myrna Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass Half Empty
or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POLY 759, 775-76 (2007).
85
Id. at 777.
86
Jeffrey Fisher, What Happened and What is Happening to the Confrontation
Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 590 (2007).
87
Id. at 617–18.
88
Id.
83
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encompasses statements describing ongoing activity89 as well as
statements “made immediately thereafter in direct consequence to
these occurrences but excluding descriptions of completely past
occurrences.”90 The second prong calls for a determination of
whether, in making the statement in question, the declarant is doing
precisely what a witness does at trial:91 answering questions rather
than volunteering statements to an official.92 Professor Fisher then
proceeds to apply this framework to settings beyond fresh accusations
to police officers, including statements to private victims’ service
organizations, medical personnel, and victims’ parents.93
In his article, University of Nebraska Law Professor Roger Kirst
examines the decisions in Davis and Hammon to articulate practical
rules to guide day-to-day judicial decision making in the real world.94
Professor Kirst explains that the different outcomes in Davis and
Hammon turn on whether the speaker was facing an ongoing
emergency when she spoke.95 Thus, to Professor Kirst, it is crucial to
determine what constitutes the end of an emergency. He notes that
different kinds of emergencies, e.g. seeking medical care or
prevention of a threatened or ongoing assault,96 as well as the identity
of the declarant, e.g. victim or bystander,97 may, though not
necessarily, require different modes of analysis. For further guidance,
Professor Kirst then examines cases in which certiorari was denied or
in which the writ was granted, the judgment vacated, and the case

89

Id. at 590.
Id. at 608–09. (“Only the res gestae concept was developed in order to
interlock with constitutional restrictions respecting the introduction of out-of-court
testimony against criminal defendants.”). For a modern day return to traditional “res
gestae” evidentiary principle to address Crawford’s Confrontation Clause concern
about spontaneous statements (541 U.S. at 58, n.8), see State v. Branch, 865 A.2d
673, 690-91 (N.J. 2005).
91
Fisher, supra note 86, at 614–16.
92
Id. at 616.
93
Id. at 616–26.
94
Roger Kirst, Confrontation Rules after Davis v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y
635, 636 (2007).
95
Id. at 641–44.
96
Id. at 644.
97
Id.
90
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remanded in light of Davis.98
He then restates Davis as rules,99 and looks at the cases on remand
and other post-Davis decisions to assess Davis in a variety of factual
settings.100 Professor Kirst concludes by examining Davis in the
context of overall confrontation doctrine.101
Professor Myrna Raeder concludes that the so-called bright line
“primary purpose test” has and will continue to prove difficult to
apply, creating special problems and uncertainties in domestic violence
cases.102 In her view, “primary purpose” gives little guidance to
lower courts in determining what qualifies as an ongoing emergency
and whether the statement helps to resolve it.103 Consequently, the
lack of guidance has led to an overbroad and inconsistent
interpretation of what qualifies as an emergency.104 Profesor Raeder
believes that whether there is an ongoing emergency may well and
unacceptedly turn on whether the 911 operator asks questions in the
present or past tense.105 She further notes that many decisions
seemingly hinge on whether the defendant is still at home, while
others indicate that the emergency is not over if the defendant could
return.106 These results, she argues, fail to follow the “Supreme
Court’s narrow view of context in assessing whether an emergency
existed in Hammon.”107

98

Id. at 644–62.
Id. at 662–63.
100
Id. at 644–77.
101
Id. at 677–83.
102
Raeder, supra note 84, at 788–89.
103
Id. at 764.
104
Id. at 766–67.
105
Id. at 765.
106
Id. at 771.
107
Id.
99
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Testimonial Statements to Private Persons
All of the statements at issue in Crawford and Davis were made to
the government. Certainly it is reasonable to read the two cases as
requiring government involvement in the making of the statements, if
only as a passive recipient it—at least until the Court holds otherwise.
Nonetheless, Davis cited a case that arguably raises a question about
the need for governmental involvement.
According to the majority opinion, relying on common law
English cases, Davis sought “to cast McCottry in the unlikely role of
a witness.”108 Justice Scalia quickly noted that none of the cited cases
involved statements made during an ongoing emergency.109 He then
gave as an example King v. Brasier,110 in which a five year-old girl,
Mary Harris, immediately on her returning home, described the
circumstances of a sexual assault to her mother and a woman lodger in
their home.111 The next day, the five year-old, accompanied by her
mother, went to the defendant’s lodgings, where she identified him.112
The statements were subsequently held inadmissible, and Justice Scalia
observed that Brasier would be helpful to Davis “if the relevant
statement had been the girl’s screams for aid as she was being chased
by her assailant; however, by the time the victim got home, her story
was an account of past events.”113
In his article,114 Professor Richard Friedman posits that Justice
Scalia, in distinguishing Brasier, “[appeared] to endorse it” as
involving a testimonial statement, even though that the statement was
not made to a law enforcement officer.115 Indeed, Professor Friedman
contends that Brasier had itself referred to the five year-old’s
accusation as testimony,116 and Professor Jeffrey Fisher agrees.117
108

Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006).
Id.
110
1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779).
111
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277.
112
168 Eng.Rep. 202 (1779).
113
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277.
114
Friedman, supra note 74, at 564.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 564–65 n.43.
117
Fisher, supra note 86, at 593. See also Robert B. Mosteller, Testing the
Testimonial Concept, and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead
109
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Moreover, according to Professor Friedman: “Brasier made no
new law . . . rather its significance is that it reflects the common
understanding . . . at the time . . . of the framing of the Sixth
Amendment that an out-of-court accusation, even one made very soon
after the event, was testimonial in nature and therefore not
admissible.”118 He continues that “such a deeply seated understanding
of the confrontation right should be given considerable weight in
determining the Clause’s modern meaning.”119
In contrast to the Friedman-Fisher view, Professor Thomas Davies
points to the reporting of the rulings in Brasier as illustrating the
dangers of working with reports of English criminal trials from the
late eighteenth century.120 Professor Davies asserts that the 1815
version of Brasier, relied upon by the Petitioners’ briefs and opinion
in Davis, was very different from the original report published in
1789.121 That original report indicated that Brasier was convicted on
the unsworn testimony of the five year-old girl who testified at trial,
and the issue was resolved in the defendant’s favor because unsworn
testimony could not be received at trial. There was, however, neither
mention of the child’s statements to the mother and lodger,122 nor of
the error in receiving them into evidence.
Professor Davies concludes that it was not until well after the
framing that the later version of Brasier could have come, if it ever
did, to the attention of the Framers.123 Professor Davies rejects the
idea that the later version of Brasier and its purported testimonial
language could be relied upon to show the English practice during the
Framing Era.124 He does so because, as far as the Framers could have
Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 909, 927 (2007) (the child’s statement to her mother was
testimony and could not be received because the child was not under oath).
118
Friedman, supra note 74, at 565.
119
Id.
120
Davies, supra note 29, at 428.
121
Id. at 438–41. In addition, to the 1789 and 1815 reports of Brasier, there
was also an 1800 footnote to the 1789 report and an 1806 report of the case in a
treatise that made mention of the child’s statements. For a discussion of the several
reports of Brasier, see Mosteller, supra note 117, at 927–31.
122
See Davies, supra note 29, at 438–39 n.217.
123
Id. at 438–39.
124
Id. at 465.
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known, “the issue of what could constitute admissible evidence in the
case of a child rape victim who was too young to be sworn, was
understood to be a uniquely difficult and unsettled question.”125
Finally, Professor Davies views the 1815 version of Brasier,
regarding the mother’s statements, as having neither said nor implied
anything about the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
evidence.126 Rather, he concludes that the later version of the Brasier
decision “simply restated the same blanket exclusion of unsworn
hearsay evidence that was also set out by the treatises and manuals of
the time.”127
Professor Randolph Jonakait concludes that Brasier reflects
nothing more than the principle “that out-of-court statements from an
incompetent witness could not be admitted in a criminal trial.”128
Moreover, “[Brasier] says nothing about the hearsay rule generally,
hearsay exceptions or the right of confrontation”;129 it takes “a highly
creative, and perhaps a highly anachronistic eye to find a
confrontation meaning in Brasier.”130
Finally, on the meaning of Brasier, Anthony Franze, a co-author
of an amicus brief on behalf of the National Association of Counsel
for Children in Davis v. Washington, offers a slightly different
perspective in his Symposium article.131 Mr. Franze reviews the
common law before and after Brasier, as well as treatises and
subsequent cases to see the meaning given to Brasier following its
publication. From this, he concludes that Brasier has no place in
confrontation doctrine.132
125

Id. at 444.
Id. at 443–44.
127
Id. at 444.
128
Jonakait, supra note 35, at 474–77.
129
Id. at 472.
130
Id. at 474; see also Mosteller, supra note 117 at 931 (Brasier “played no
direct role in shaping confrontation because the Framers could not possibly have
known about it as a hearsay/confrontation case, and it therefore could not have
affected their thinking. . . . The [Brasier] judges gave no indication of being
concerned as to whether the statement was testimonial, nor do they take note of any of
the circumstances that . . . might lead to treating the statement as testimonial.”).
131
Anthony Franze, The Confrontation Clause and Originialism’s Lessons from
King v. Brasier, 15 J.L. & POL’Y at 495 (2007).
132
Id. at 508–09.
126
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Mr. Franze further reasons that it is unlikely the Framers would
have been aware of any version of Brasier and, in light of “the legal
authorities that were available in Framing-Era America, they [well
could] have understood that hearsay accounts by parents, doctors and
acquaintances concerning statements made by child sex abuse victims
would be admissible in criminal trials without regard to whether the
statements would now be considered ‘testimonial’ or ‘non
testimonial.’”133 Finally, Mr. Franze argues that Brasier demonstrates
some of the practical limitations of originalism as an interpretative
construct for constitutional criminal procedure decisions.134
Formality
In Crawford the Court describes testimonial statements as being
formal135 and solemn136 in nature. The structured, tape-recorded
custodial interrogation of Sylvia Crawford following a Miranda
warning was apparently formal enough for the seven-justice majority
in Crawford,137 and a unanimous Court in Hammon agreed.138 To be
sure, the Crawford interrogation was more formal than the in-home
interrogation of Amy Hammon. Still, “[i]t was formal enough that
Amy [Hammon]’s interrogation was conducted in a separate room,
away from her husband (who tried to intervene), with the officer
receiving her replies for use in his investigat[ion].”139 To the Davis
majority, “[t]he solemnity of even an oral declaration of relevant past
fact to an investigating officer is well enough established by the severe

133

Id. at 500.
Id. at 500–02.
135
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 38, 51–52 (2004).
136
Id.
137
See id. at 53 n.4, 61, 65 (the opinion never expressly characterizes the
statement as formal, though its descriptions imply that characterization, as does its
recognition that the statement is testimonial, whatever the definition).
138
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006) (Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, who had replaced the Crawford concurrers, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O’Connor, joined the Davis majority, and Justice Thomas also agreed that
Sylvia Crawford’s Miranda-warned custodial statement was testimonial in nature).
139
Id. at 2278.
134
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[criminal] consequences that can attend a deliberate falsehood.”140
Finally, Davis contrasts the calm and tranquil interrogations of
Hammon and Crawford to the frantic statements of McCottry in Davis,
in an environment that was neither tranquil nor safe.141
In dissent, Justice Thomas argued that a living room conversation
with a police officer hardly bears the formality or solemnity of
formalized testimonial materials or, for that matter, the solemnity
present during the police interrogation of a person, i.e. Sylvia
Crawford, following a warning that anything said can be used against
him or her in a court of law.142
Mr. Justice Scalia responded to Justice Thomas: “We do not
dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance. But
we no longer have examining Marian magistrates; and we do have, as
our 18th-century forebears did not, examining police officers–who
perform investigative and testimonial functions once performed by
examining Marian magistrates.” Justice Scalia concluded: “It imports
sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are
criminal offenses.”143 Notably, Justice Scalia nowhere suggests that
the person being interrogated need even be aware that lying to a police
officer is a criminal offense, and if the declarant is unaware of the
status of the person to whom he or she is speaking, then there is no
crime.144
The Hammon holding and the Scalia-Thomas exchange denote
a malleable formality requirement, at least with respect to police

140

Id. at 2276; see also id. at 2279, n.5 (“It imports sufficient formality, in our
view that lies to such officers are criminal offenses.”). But see Robert P. Mosteller,
Softening the Formality and formalism of the Testimonial Concept, 19 REGENT L.
REV. 429, 441 n.55, 442 n.57 (2007) (“these statutes [making it unlawful to lie to the
police] have no relationship to the concerns of the Confrontation Clause and a system
that uses them as a dividing line for coverage would be absolutely ahistoric” and
illogical because “the states’ treatment of this crime is far from uniform.”).
141
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277.
142
Id. at 2282–83 n.5.
143
Id. at 2278. See Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism
of the Testimonial Statement Concept, 19 REGENT L. REV. 429, 438–39 (that lies are
crimes equaling formality is “curious,” “bizarre” and “inexplicable,” coming “largely
out of the blue” with the potential of providing a significant limitation on the scope of
testimonial statements).
144
See Mosteller, supra note 143, at 445–46.
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interrogation-produced statements.145 Unless abandoned or made less
stringent, however, formality may prove an insurmountable obstacle to
deciding that accusatory statements to private individuals are
nontestimonial.
*

*

*

Given the formality discussion and the Hammon holding in Davis,
Professor Richard Freidman concludes that there is no rule that the
testimonial nature of a statement turns on its formal nature.146
Moreover, even if there is a formality requirement, Professor
Friedman is satisfied by a showing that it would be objectively
apparent to a reasonable person that the interrogation was being held
for prosecutorial purposes.147
Law Enforcement Reports and Expert Testimony Based upon a
Testimonial Statement Disclosed to the Jury
In Crawford, Justice Scalia declared that business records, “by
their nature, were not testimonial.”148 Neither the Crawford nor Davis
majority opinions make any reference to public records or reports.149
True, some governmental records and reports may be akin to the
nontestimonial private business records. On the other hand, some
modern day governmental reports that are created for evidentiary
purposes—e.g. DNA, fingerprints, blood alcohol level, ballistics,
chemical composition and weight of substances—are a far cry, if not a
completely separate and distinct species, from nontestimonial private
business records of 1791.
145

Id. at 434 (Davis “clearly eliminated some of the extreme readings of
formality and generally softened the requirement”).
146
Friedman, supra note 74, at 571.
147
Id.
148
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). Justice Scalia also
concludes that, at the time of the Framing, there was a hearsay exception for business
records. Id. But see Davies, supra note 29, at 365–66 (questions the existence of any
such exception during the Framing-Era).
149
But see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting with approval the
majority’s nontestimonial characterization of business and “official” records).
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These governmental reports, and the scientific tests and techniques
that produce their findings and results, also bear little, if any, kinship
or resemblance to statements of witnesses and accomplices secured by
the civil law modes of criminal prosecution. Moreover, they are not
produced by police interrogation.
Still, both Crawford and Davis leave no doubt that there are other
subcategories of testimonial evidence than the few mentioned in the
two opinions.150 Also, Crawford cautioned that “[i]nvolvement of
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse.”151 Further,
Davis warned that “restricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise
forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its
extinction.”152
In her symposium article, U.C.L.A. Professor Jennifer Mnookin
addresses Crawford’s impact on the admissibility of expert evidence in
two recurring settings.153 She first discusses the introduction of
written forensic reports without the live testimony of a report’s
preparer.154 Second, she examines situations in which a testifying
expert seeks to disclose hearsay of other individuals155 upon which the
testifying expert has relied in reaching his or her conclusion.156
At the outset of her article, Professor Mnookin notes that “while
Davis does not . . . speak directly to the question of expert evidence
under Crawford, its turn to a ‘primary purpose test’ may influence
how courts assess whether laboratory reports and matters upon which
experts rely are testimonial.”157 She also explains why characterizing
such reports as business records does not, automatically, resolve the

150

Id. at 68; Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006).
541 U.S. at 56 n.7; see also id. at 53 (expressing concern about the risk
posed by “the involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial
evidence”).
152
126 S.Ct at 2278 n.5.
153
Jennifer Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y at 791, 797 (2007).
154
Id. at 797–801.
155
Id. at 800.
156
Id. at 865–69.
157
Id. at 793–94 n.10. See also GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 458 (Foundation
Press Supp. 2006–07).
151
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testimonial issue.158
As for the testimonial nature of forensic reports or laboratory test
results (in some jurisdictions called certificates of analysis), she
concludes—after a thorough examination of the arguments on both
sides—that most of these reports are testimonial in nature, requiring
the previously uncross-examined preparer to testify at trial.159 She
acknowledges, however, that the “great majority of courts analyzing
expert disclosure issues . . . by hook or by crook, [are] holding that
these [reports and] disclosures are not testimonial.”160
As for the situation in which a testifying expert seeks to support
his or her opinion by disclosing a testimonial statement of another
expert or non-expert, Professor Mnookin concludes that the value of
these out-of-court statements rests in the truth of the facts asserted in
them. Thus, she concludes, disclosing such statements to the trier of
fact violates the Confrontation Clause. Again, with one notable New
York exception, she expresses disappointment over the decisions.161
In the final part of her article, Professor Mnookin recognizes
certain situations in which there is a genuine need for the admissibility
of a testimonial report, and she offers some suggestions seeking to
balance that need against the goals and purposes of Crawford.162
Included among these suggestions is that perhaps in certain settings,
the immutability of the Crawford principles should be modified.163
Nontestimonial Statements
Crawford offered both general and specific examples of
nontestimonial statements, such as business records,164 statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy,165 off-hand overheard remarks,166 casual
158
159
160
161

Mnookin, supra note 153, at 794, 829–32.
See id. at 806; see generally, id at 809–842.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 823–25 (citing People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 N.E.2d 727

(2005)).
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 858–62.
Id. at 860.
541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 51.
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remarks to an acquaintance,167 statements by one prisoner to another
blaming defendant for his incarceration,168 and statements made
unwittingly to an FBI informant.169
The majority opinion was a study in deliberate ambiguity as to
whether the Confrontation Clause is exclusively concerned with
testimonial statements or if it encompasses nontestimonial hearsay as
well.170 Given this ambiguity, most state and federal courts had
concluded that the admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay statements is
still governed by the Ohio v. Roberts indicia of reliability
framework.171
Subsequently in Davis, after noting that it had not been necessary
to resolve the question in Crawford, Justice Scalia stated: “We must
decide, therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to
testimonial hearsay.”172 In so doing, he sought to put the final nail in

167

Id.
Id. at 57, (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970)); accord Davis
v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2775 (2006).
169
541 U.S. at 58 (citing Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181–84
[1987]); accord Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2275.
170
Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 (“Even if the Sixth Amendment is not
solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object. . . .”), with id.
at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law–as
does [Ohio v.] Roberts and as would an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”). Compare id. at 50 (“This [testimonial]
focus also suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core
concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a
good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the
civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.”), with id. at 51 (“An accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that
a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”); see 541 U.S. at
61 (while the analysis in Crawford casts doubt on Confrontation Clause protection for
nontestimonial statements, there is no need to definitively resolve the issue because
Sylvia Crawford’s statement is testimonial under any definition). Chief Justice
Rehnquist had no doubt that the Crawford majority “choosing the path it [did] of
course overturned Roberts.” 541 U.S. at 75.
171
See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S.
1079, 125 S.Ct. 938 (2005); State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 814–28 (Wis. 2005).
172
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006).
168
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the coffin.173 Despite the relative clarity of the opinion,174 some state
and federal courts still use the Roberts framework to test the
admissibility of nontestimonial statements.175
Finally, in Whorton v. Bockting, an unanimous Court held that
Crawford was not a “watershed decision implicating fundamental
fairness and accuracy,” and thus undeserving of retroactive application
in a collateral proceeding.176 In that opinion, Justice Alito, for a
unanimous Court, nailed the Roberts coffin shut.177
*

173

*

*

See id. at 2273 (“It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates
it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay
evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”); id. (“Only [testimonial]
statements . . . cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause.”); id. at 2274 (“A [testimonial] limitation so clearly reflected in
the text of the [Sixth Amendment] must fairly be said to mark out not merely its
‘core,’ but its perimeter.”). See also 126 S.Ct. at 2275 n.4 (“We overruled Roberts in
Crawford by restoring the unavailability and cross-examination requirements.”); 126
S.Ct. at 2280 (“Crawford, in overruling Roberts, did not destroy the ability of courts
to protect the integrity of their proceedings” via the forfeiture doctrine).
174
But see James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v.
Roberts, 2006 Fall CRIM. JUST. 37, 37–38 (2006) (Justice Scalia’s statement of
overruling, “like the Da Vinci code, was one you have to look quite closely to
find. . . . It is hard to imagine how [overruling Roberts] could have possibly been
announced any more subtly or indirectly without using some foreign language.”).
175
See, e.g., Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 857–58 n.6 (8th Cir. 2006);
State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 2006). Within two weeks of each other,
two panels of the Seventh Circuit, with one judge in common, reached sort of
different conclusions. Compare United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir.
2006) (nontestimonial statements, which continue to be evaluated under Ohio v.
Roberts, implicate the confrontation right), with United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d
660, 665 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (Davis “appears” to have held that nontestimonial
statements are not subject to the Confrontation Clause).
176
127 S.Ct. 1173, 1182–89 (2007).
177
Id. (“Crawford overruled Roberts because Roberts was inconsistent with the
original understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. . . . Under
Crawford, . . . the Confrontation Clause has no application to [out-of-court
nontestimonial] statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack
indicia of reliability.”). As seen from the text in note 170, supra, Crawford did not
overrule Roberts with respect to protection for unreliable nontestimonial statements.
See Mosteller, supra note 18, at 700 n.56.
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In his symposium article, Duke University Professor Robert
Mosteller mourns the loss of Confrontation Clause protection provided
by Roberts for unreliable nontestimonial accusatory hearsay
statements.178 In particular, he points to the Court’s holding in Idaho
v. Wright that the Confrontation Clause had been violated by the
introduction at trial of a young child’s accusatory statements that had
been elicited by the leading question of a pediatrician, and which were
not otherwise supported by the Roberts required particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.179
Professor Mosteller argues problematic hearsay of this ilk is on
the periphery of the confrontation right, presenting a “functionally
related” problem that ought to lend itself to Confrontation Clause
protection, even if not as complete as that required for core violations.
In support of his argument, inter alia, he points to other areas of
constitutional criminal procedure in which additional types of
protections have been guaranteed,180 the historical relationship between
confrontation and hearsay,181 the ambiguities of the Raleigh trial
involving three different hearsay kinds of statements,182 and the
difficulty and uncertainty of translating history, channeling the
Framers, and applying it all in a modern context.183
Professor Mosteller acknowledges that with Roberts’ demise,
constitutional protection against problematic nontestimonial hearsay
178
Mosteller, supra note 18, 15 J.L. & POL’Y at 686. Of course, Professor
Mosteller would be more than satisfied if the Court brought unreliable accusatory
statements to private individuals under the testimonial umbrella, but he is doubtful the
Court will do so. See Mosteller, supra note 117, at 948. The testimonial nature of
such statements is considered in the text accompanying notes 108–34, supra.
179
497 U.S. 805, 818–25 (1990). The decision in Wright is notable by the
Crawford majority’s failure to discuss or even mention it. See Introduction, supra note
18, at 1, 3–4 n.11. The confrontation violation in Wright might also be present under
Crawford because there was evidence in the record that the pediatrician was acting at
the behest of the police, and the child has spent the night before the interview in
police custody. See Margaret A. Berger, DeConstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 603–
04 (1992).
180
Mosteller, supra note 18, at 701−02.
181
Id. at 701–03.
182
Id. at 712–18 (Cobham’s ex parte examination and letters to the Privy
Council, and the trial testimony of an ocean pilot describing a Lisbon conversation
with a Portuguese gentleman, discussed in note 18, supra).
183
Id. at 19–22.
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statements must find another home.184 That new home may be the Due
Process Clause, which, unlike the Confrontation Clause, is concerned
with the reliability of evidence.185 Whether a hearsay statement is
within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception has no relevance in a due
process reliability inquiry.186
Forfeiture
In dictum, Crawford accepted “the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing [which] extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially
equitable grounds.”187
In Davis, the Court reiterated that
acceptance.188
As noted earlier, Davis rejected a more flexible testimonial
standard for statements made by domestic violence victims.189 Lower
courts, however, may well be more responsive to greater flexibility
with regard to forfeiture in the domestic violence setting, given the
invitation to do so by Davis: domestic violence crimes are
“notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to

184

See id. at 723.
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 187 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J.
concurring) (“Due process does not permit a conviction . . . on . . . [hearsay]
evidence so unreliable and untrustworthy that it may be said that the accused had been
tried by a kangaroo court. . . . [W]here the prosecution’s entire case is built upon
hearsay testimony of an unavailable witness . . . the defendant would be entitled to a
hearing on the reliability of the testimony.”); White, 502 U.S. at 363–64 (Thomas, J.
concurring) (reliability of hearsay “is more properly a due process than a
confrontation concern.”). See Andrew Z. Teslitz, What Remains of Reliability:
Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM.
JUST. 39, 54 (Summer 2005) (post-Crawford assurance of reliability is embraced by
free standing Due Process, i.e. not encompassed by a specific provision of the Bill of
Rights). See generally Jerrold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal
Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidlines, 45 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 303, 397 (2001) (Supreme Court free-standing due process rulings “tend to focus
on the value of adjudicatory fairness [looking primarily to protect against the
conviction of the innocent].”).
186
Teslitz, supra note 185, at 49.
187
541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–
59 (1897)).
188
126 S.Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).
189
Id.
185
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ensure that she does not testify at trial.”190 The opinion continued:
“when defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring
or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment
does not require courts to acquiesce.”191
In related dicta, the Court touched upon procedural aspects of
forfeiture. Thus, while “tak[ing] no position on the standards
necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture,”192 Davis went out of its way
to note that “ . . . federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine,193 have generally
held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
[and] [s]tate courts tend to follow the same practice.”194 Moreover,
the advisory and dicta-prone majority noted that if a hearing on
forfeiture is required, “hearsay evidence, including the unavailable
witness’s out-of-court statements, may be considered.”195
*

*

*

In his article, University of South Carolina Professor James
Flanagan’s primary argument is that forfeiture by wrongdoing, which
he believes should instead be called “waiver by misconduct,” should
not occur without the defendant’s intent to cause a witness’s
unavailability.196 Professor Flanagan acknowledges that Crawford’s
190

Id.
Id. at 2279–80.
192
Id. at 2280.
193
On its face, FRE 804(b)(6) requires an intent to prevent a witness from
testifying as an element of forfeiture. Post Davis, whether constitutional forfeiture
requires that same intent has divided the courts. Compare, e.g., State v. Mason, 162
P.3d 396, 404 (Wash. 2007) (no intent required), with People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d
243, 245–47 (Colo. 2007) (intent required). See also People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d
333, 350–52, 353 (Ill. 2007) (requiring an intent but noting that there may be an
exception in homicide cases) (authorities on both sides collected).
194
Davis, 126 S.Ct at 2280 (emphasis supplied and citation omitted). But see
Davis, 162 P.3d at 404 (requiring clear and convincing evidence establishing that the
accused’s wrongdoing has caused the unavailability of the declarant); People v.
Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 367, 649 N.E.2d 817 (1995) (same).
195
126 S.Ct. at 2280.
196
James Flanagan, Foreshadowing the Future of Forfeiture/Estoppel by
Wrongdoing: Davis v. Washington and the Necessity of the Defendant’s Intent to
Intimidate the Witness, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 863, 864–65 (2007).
191
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references to the doctrine of waiver as “forfeiture by wrongdoing”
implied that intent was irrelevant and that confrontation rights could
be terminated whenever the witness’s absence could be traced to the
defendant’s wrongdoing.197 As a result, post-Crawford lower court
decisions expanded the doctrine far beyond prior precedent and
history.198
The Davis opinion corrected this misimpression, concludes
Professor Flanagan, when it “all but stat[ed] that the estoppel doctrine
is limited to witness-tampering cases.”199 Professor Flanagan also
notes that Justice Scalia’s use of such words as “procure” and
“coerce” with regard to silencing witnesses describes “purposeful
acts” on the part of the defendant, as does the reference to
interference with the “judicial process.”200
Professor Flanagan
concludes: “Davis seems to have clearly adopted the intent to prevent
testimony element.”201
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer focuses on the need to
reconceptualize the forfeiture doctrine as it applies to domestic
violence cases and their hallmark abusive relationships.202 In many of
those cases, she points out, the abuse that rendered the victim
unavailable had occurred even before the crime charged was
committed.203 Consequently, there is an absence of traditional witness
tampering and the abuse involved is not always identified as
misconduct. Accordingly, she reasons that to properly address
forfeiture principles in domestic violence settings, courts must
recognize and acknowledge patterns of violence and abuse. In this
regard, Professor Tuerkheimer emphasizes the crucial need to consider
the relationship between the abusing defendant and the abused victim
in determining whether the defendant has caused the victim to be
197

Id. at 874.
Id. at 875–78.
199
Id. at 878.
200
Id. at 880–82.
201
Id. at 887. Professor Flanagan further argues that courts should require a
“but for” causal connection between the defendant’s act and the witness’s
unavailability, and he sets forth several reasons for a stronger causal relationship. Id.
at 891.
202
Tuerkheimer, supra note 60, at 746.
203
Id. at 747.
198
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unavailable.204
Professor Myrna Raeder views an intent to prevent a person from
testifying as not being required when that person has been murdered,
but should be required in domestic violence cases when a domestic
violence victim fails to appear at trial.205 Professor Raeder rejects the
arguments that forfeiture should be presumed and that particularized
evidence should be required to establish that the defendant caused the
victim’s absence with the intent to prevent the victim from testifying.206
She also notes that placing the burden on defendant to prove a lack of
coercion or misconduct seems particularly unfair because of the
inherent difficulties in proving a negative.207 Finally, Professor Raeder,
like Professor Tuerkheimer, advocates for an expanded relevance
standard with respect to forfeiture in domestic violence cases—
including evidence of abusive patterns, individual acts of abuse, prior
charges of abuse, prior recantations by the victim, and evidence of
post-traumatic stress disorder.208
* * *
The above highlights of the articles from this symposium barely
scratch the surface of the confrontation treasures in store for the
reader. Also awaiting Crawford-philes is a seemingly endless flow of
state and federal confrontation/hearsay decisions, at least a few of
which will end up in the Supreme Court. Indeed this past June, a
petition for certiorari was filed with respect to the testimonial nature of
laboratory reports.209 Doubtless other cases will reach the Court, as it
seeks, “in a process that will take decades,”210 to fashion a
comprehensive Confrontation Clause Code of Evidence. Crawford and
Beyond III et seq. will be waiting patiently in the wings. Put another
way, “It ain’t over ‘till it’s over.”211
204

Id. at 748.
Raeder, supra note 84, at 778–79.
206
Id. at 780–81.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Compare, State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. 2007) (laboratory
report that substance tested was cocaine prepared solely to be introduced at trial is
“testimonial” as it bears all the characteristics of an ex parte affidavit) cert pet.
pending No. 06-1699, sched. for conf. 9/24/07, with Commonwealth v. Verde, 827
N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (public laboratory report identifying a tested substance
as cocaine is a nontestimonial public record).
210
Friedman, supra note 74, at 586.
211
YOGI BERRA, supra *, at 121.
205

